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OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Kenneth C. Antol sued the Defense Logistics Agency of 
the Department of Defense, alleging gender discrimination under 
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), disability discrimination 
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791, and a 
violation of the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance 
Act (VEVRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4214.  Both parties moved for summary 
judgment; the district court granted the Agency's motion on all 
claims.  We conclude that the district court properly granted 
summary judgment for the Agency on Antol's gender discrimination 
claim and his claim for non-monetary relief under VEVRA, that it 
should have dismissed his VEVRA claim for money damages for lack 
of jurisdiction, and that it properly denied his motion for 
summary judgment on his disability discrimination claim.0  We 
find, however, a material issue of fact precluding summary 
judgment for the Agency on Antol's disability discrimination 
claim.  Therefore, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and 
remand the cause to the district court for it to consider the 
disability discrimination claim brought under the Rehabilitation 
Act. 
I. 
                     
0
"[W]hen an appeal from a denial of summary judgment is raised in 
tandem with an appeal of an order granting a cross-motion for 
summary judgment, we have jurisdiction to review the propriety of 
the denial of summary judgment by the district court." Nazay v. 
Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1328 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 Antol is employed by the Defense Logistics Agency as a 
Budget Assistant.  He is also a veteran of the United States 
Army, with a seizure disorder amounting to a "30 percent or more 
disability."  As required by VEVRA, the Agency promulgated an 
affirmative action plan for disabled veterans.  That plan 
provides that highly qualified veterans with 30% or more 
disability would be preferred for available positions and 
afforded a non-competitive interview, before competitive 
interviews of merit candidates and before the selecting officer 
receives the merit promotion list.  The plan allows disabled 
veterans to be considered before the general competition for a 
position in the hopes that more would be promoted than under a 
wholly competitive procedure. 
 In 1991, Antol submitted an application for "Contract 
Specialist GS-1102-5, Target 9," a trainee position which 
eventually leads to a professional-level grade, requiring either 
specific job experience or a college degree.  There were two 
positions available in this job classification.  When he applied, 
Antol had approximately 30 college credit hours, but no degree. 
The Agency certified Antol as qualified for the position based on 
his work experience.  To afford Antol a non-competitive 
interview, the Agency's office in Philadelphia referred Antol's 
application to Mr. Gomez, the selecting officer's supervisor in 
Pittsburgh, who then referred it to Mr. Smith, the selecting 
officer.  Contrary to the explicit requirements of the plan, 
Smith received a list of the merit candidates before Antol's non-
competitive interview.    
 Smith interviewed Antol first, but did not offer him 
the position.  Later, Smith interviewed Antol again, then as a 
merit candidate.  Between Antol's two interviews, Smith 
interviewed three female applicants:  Arlene Bigger, Karen Davis, 
and Angelmarie Scott.   Smith selected Davis and Scott, who each 
hold a college degree but are not disabled veterans.  According 
to Smith's affidavit, Antol was informed on November 18, 1991, 
that he had been rejected.0 
 Antol initiated informal counselling within the 
defendant Agency, claiming that he was not selected for the 
promotion based on his disability.  Antol then filed a formal 
complaint alleging disability discrimination.  The Agency 
investigated his complaint and issued its final decision, which 
found no discrimination.  Antol appealed the final Agency 
decision to the Office of Federal Operations of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.  After exhausting his 
administrative remedies on the charge of disability 
discrimination, Antol sued the defendant Agency in federal court. 
Both parties moved for summary judgment. 
II. 
                     
0This date is relevant to the dispute over whether Antol is 
entitled to a jury trial and compensatory damages under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, which took effect on November 21, 1991.  In 
Landgraf v. USI Films, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), the Supreme Court 
ruled that the Act did not apply retroactively.  Because the 
district court granted summary judgment, it did not have occasion 
to rule on Antol's request for a jury trial and compensatory 
damages or to address his argument that Landgraf does not apply 
because he alleges a continuing violation.  The district court 
should address this issue in the first instance. 
 The affirmative action plan required the Agency to 
refer qualified disabled veterans for non-competitive selection 
before referring other candidates.  Antol contends that the 
Agency discriminated against him because he is disabled and 
violated VEVRA when, contrary to the terms of the plan, it 
referred his name along with the names of the three other merit 
candidates.  He also contends generally that the Agency did not 
select him for the position because he is disabled.  The Agency 
offered as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that Smith 
chose the best qualified candidate based on his preference for a 
college graduate and based on the candidate's work experience. 
Because the two successful candidates were female, Antol also 
claims gender discrimination.   
 On appeal from summary judgment, we view the evidence 
de novo and in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 
to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact 
and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. 
There must, however, be sufficient evidence 
for a jury to return a verdict in favor of 
the nonmoving party; if the evidence is 
merely colorable or not significantly 
probative, summary judgment should be 
granted. 
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citations omitted). 
III. 
 Antol challenges the summary judgment for the Agency on 
his gender discrimination claim, arguing that when the Agency 
chose two females for the position instead of him, it violated 
Title VII.  The Agency argues that we should affirm the summary 
judgment on two grounds:  1)Antol failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies;0 and 2) Antol failed to produce evidence 
of pretext.  We find that Antol failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies and will affirm the summary judgment for 
the Agency on this claim. 
 The Agency points out that Antol never asserted gender 
discrimination in any of the administrative proceedings.  Antol 
responds that gender discrimination was fairly within the scope 
of the EEOC proceedings investigating his disability 
discrimination claim.  He cites Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233 
(3d Cir. 1984) (per curiam), to establish the proposition that he 
is excused from exhausting his administrative remedies.  
 In Waiters we held: 
The relevant test in determining whether 
appellant was required to exhaust her 
administrative remedies, therefore, is 
whether the acts alleged in the subsequent 
Title VII suit are fairly within the scope of 
the prior EEOC complaint, or the 
investigation arising therefrom. 
Id. at 237.  At issue was whether Waiters' suit in federal court, 
alleging a retaliatory firing for filing previous complaints with 
the EEOC, was fairly within the earlier EEOC complaint charging 
retaliation.  We held that the plaintiff's suit was not barred 
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the core 
                     
0The district court did not address the Agency's argument that 
Antol failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for the 
gender discrimination claim.  As exhaustion is a prerequisite to 
bringing suit, we will address this threshold issue.   
grievance in the suit filed and the earlier EEOC complaint were 
the same--retaliation.  Requiring a new EEOC filing for each and 
every discriminatory act would not serve the purposes of the 
statutory scheme where the later discriminatory acts fell 
squarely within the scope of the earlier EEOC complaint or 
investigation. 
 Unlike the suit in Waiters, Antol's gender 
discrimination claim does not fall within the scope of the EEOC 
complaint or investigation.  The affidavit of the EEO Manager 
responsible for processing Antol's complaint stated that: 
the issue and basis for the complaint 
presented to the EEO counselor was that of 
non-selection for promotion based upon an 
alleged physical handicap (seizure disorder). 
Mr. Antol did not raise the issue of sex 
discrimination at the informal counseling 
stage of the administrative process. . . . 
The affidavit further provides that Antol failed to raise gender 
discrimination in the formal administrative process as well, and 
that "the sole issue investigated was that of handicap 
discrimination."  
 Antol asserts here that investigation of his disability 
discrimination complaint 
must inevitably have developed the facts of 
the alleged discriminatory event:  two women 
were promoted, while a man was not promoted; 
furthermore, there is a history of women 
being offered advancement through promotion 
to the position in question. . . . These acts 
were squarely before the investigator and 
could have been investigated. 
(emphasis added).  Antol even admits that he never suspected 
gender discrimination during the administrative process. 
Nonetheless, he now argues that gender discrimination fell within 
the scope of the EEOC investigation.  We disagree. 
 The specifics of his disability discrimination charge 
do not fairly encompass a claim for gender discrimination merely 
because investigation would reveal that Antol is a man and the 
two employees who received the positions are women.  The 
investigation focused, quite properly we think, on the gravamen 
of Antol's complaint--disability discrimination.   Neither the 
EEOC nor the agency were put on notice of a gender discrimination 
claim.  The purpose of requiring exhaustion is to afford the EEOC 
the opportunity to settle disputes through conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion, avoiding unnecessary action in 
court.  Antol failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his 
gender discrimination claim.   
IV.  
 Antol seeks to recover from the Agency under 38 U.S.C. 
§ 4214(c) for violating its affirmative action plan for disabled 
veterans.  He argues that when Congress included language in 
VEVRA instructing agencies to incorporate their affirmative 
action plans for disabled veterans into Rehabilitation Act 
§501(b) affirmative action plans, Congress created a private 
right of action for violation of a VEVRA affirmative action plan.  
The Agency responds that VEVRA's section regulating employment 
and training does not contain an express waiver of sovereign 
immunity, that there is no express private cause of action, and 
that no private cause of action against the government can be 
inferred.  We agree with the Agency that VEVRA contains no waiver 
of sovereign immunity for Antol's claim for money damages and 
will therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand the cause 
to the district court for it to dismiss this claim.  We also 
agree that VEVRA § 4214 does not provide a private right of 
action and will affirm the summary judgment on Antol's claim for 
non-monetary relief under VEVRA. 
A. 
 Section 403 of VEVRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4214, provides: 
 (a)(1) The United States has an 
obligation to assist veterans of the Armed 
Forces in readjusting to civilian life since 
veterans, by virtue of their military 
service, have lost opportunities to pursue 
education and training oriented towards 
civilian careers. . . . It is, therefore, the 
policy of the United States and the purpose 
of this section to promote the maximum of 
employment and job advancement opportunities 
within the Federal Government for disabled 
veterans and certain veterans of the Vietnam 
Era and of the post-Vietnam Era who are 
qualified for such employment and 
advancement.  
*** 
 (c) Each agency shall include in its 
affirmative action plan for the hiring, 
placement, and advancement of handicapped 
individuals in such agency as required by 
section 501(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 (29 U.S.C. 791(b)), a separate 
specification of plans . . . to promote and 
carry out such affirmative action with 
respect to disabled veterans in order to 
achieve the purpose of this section.  
(emphasis added).  Thus, under VEVRA, the Agency must include in 
its affirmative action plan required by the Rehabilitation Act a 
separate specification of its plan for disabled veterans.   
B. 
 It is a "well-settled principle that the federal 
government is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." 
FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 29 F. 3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 
1994)(in banc) (internal quotations omitted).  As an agency of 
the United States, sovereign immunity protects the Defense 
Logistics Agency of the Department of Defense.  In Re University 
Medical Center, 973 F.2d 1065, 1085 (3d Cir. 1992).  The federal 
government must unequivocally consent to be sued and the consent 
"must be construed narrowly in favor of the government." FMC 
Corp., 29 F.3d at 839.  The Supreme Court cautioned in Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2486 
(1979), that "implying a private right of action on the basis of 
congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best."   
 Antol asserts that VEVRA's express requirement--that 
the Agency include its affirmative action plan for disabled 
veterans in its Rehabilitation Act affirmative action plan--
suffices to incorporate the Rehabilitation Act's waiver of 
sovereign immunity into VEVRA.  However, merely mentioning the 
Rehabilitation Act constitutes neither an express nor an 
unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity from suit under VEVRA. 
We cannot enlarge the waiver in the Rehabilitation Act "beyond 
what the language of the statute requires." U.S. v. Idaho, ex 
rel. Director Dep't. of Water Resources, 508 U.S. 1, 113 S. Ct. 
1893, 1896 (1993).  The Agency correctly argues that the language 
in § 4214 does not purport to waive sovereign immunity or to 
create an express cause of action.  Nevertheless, Antol contends 
that when Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1978 to 
include the remedies of § 505,0 Congress knew that § 403 of VEVRA 
mentioned Rehabilitation Act § 501, and therefore Congress 
intended to incorporate into VEVRA the rights, remedies, and 
waiver of sovereign immunity expressed in the Rehabilitation Act. 
 The Supreme Court made clear, however, in U.S. v. 
Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992), that 
the "unequivocal expression" of elimination 
of sovereign immunity that we insist upon is 
an expression in statutory text.  If clarity 
does not exist there, it cannot be supplied 
by a committee report. 
112 S. Ct. at 1016.  As we stated in Beneficial Consumer Discount 
Co. v. Poltonowicz, 47 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 1995),  
even if we were disposed to imply a cause of 
action . . . , we could not imply a waiver of 
sovereign immunity with respect to that cause 
of action without running afoul of the well-
established injunction against recognizing a 
waiver of federal sovereign immunity not 
evidenced in the statutory text. 
Id. at 95, citing Idaho, 113 S. Ct. at 1896; see also Dorsey v. 
U.S. Dept. of Labor, 41 F.3d 1551, 1555 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(legislative history cannot supply an express or unequivocal 
waiver). 
                     
0Rehabilitation Act § 505(a)(1) provides: 
 
The remedies, procedures, and rights set 
forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) . . . shall be 
available, with respect to any complaint 
under section 791 of this title, to any 
employee . . . aggrieved by the final 
disposition of such complaint, or by the 
failure to take final action on such 
complaint. . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1). 
 
 The district court did not address whether VEVRA 
contained an express waiver of sovereign immunity.  It first 
concluded that the mere reference in VEVRA to the affirmative 
action plan required under § 501(b) of the Rehabilitation Act 
does not provide an express private cause of action.  It then 
concluded that a private cause of action could not be inferred 
because it found no evidence that Congress intended a private 
cause of action.0  Although it reached the correct result, the 
district court first should have considered whether Congress 
unequivocally expressed a waiver of sovereign immunity in VEVRA, 
because "[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature." FDIC 
v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1000 (1994). 
 Antol cannot point to any language in VEVRA expressing 
a waiver of sovereign immunity for his claim under 38 U.S.C. 
§4214(c).  Moreover, Congress did not include in VEVRA a section 
adopting the rights or remedies of the Rehabilitation Act.  To 
construe the reference in VEVRA to the Rehabilitation Act as a 
waiver of sovereign immunity, which Antol would have us do, we 
would have to heap inference upon inference.  But we cannot 
inferentially incorporate the waiver from the Rehabilitation Act 
                     
0The district court offered in support of its decision that the 
courts have unanimously held that another section of VEVRA, 38 
U.S.C. § 4212(a) (formerly § 2012(a)), does not create an implied 
private cause of action against federal contractors, citing 
Harris v. Adams, 873 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1989), and Barron v. 
Knightingale Roofing, Inc., 842 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1988).  The 
Courts of Appeals in Harris and Barron applied the factors from 
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and found that there was no 
evidence of congressional intent to create a private right of 
action and that implying one would conflict with VEVRA's 
legislative scheme. See 873 F.2d at 932; 842 F.2d at 21-22. 
 
into the VEVRA section at issue; a waiver in VEVRA must be 
unequivocally expressed, and the waiver of sovereign immunity in 
the Rehabilitation Act must be narrowly construed.  Therefore, we 
hold that Antol cannot maintain an action for money damages 
against the Agency under VEVRA. 
C. 
 To the extent that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 702,0 waives sovereign immunity for non-monetary claims 
made directly under 38 U.S.C. § 4214, we will address whether we 
can infer a private right of action under VEVRA.  Antol again 
argues that VEVRA's reference to the Rehabilitation Act suffices 
to create a private right of action; however, that reference does 
not purport to incorporate the rights and remedies of the 
Rehabilitation Act into VEVRA.  Analyzing the factors articulated 
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), we agree with the Agency and 
the district court that there is no private right of action under 
38 U.S.C. § 4214. 
 "The crucial question is whether Congress intended to 
create such a right." American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. M/V Cape Fear, 
967 F.2d 864, 866 (3d Cir. 1992).  The statute is silent on 
                     
0Neither party mentioned the Administrative Procedure Act, much 
less the waiver of sovereign immunity for non-monetary relief, 
and Antol did not seek review under the APA.  Arguably, the 
agency's action in failing to follow the affirmative action plan 
for disabled veterans, which it created and adopted, could be 
directly challenged under the APA; however, we hesitate to 
proceed upon this ground for review.  This complex area of 
administrative law has not been briefed before us, nor has 
appellant sought review of the Agency's action under it. 
Therefore, because Antol seeks review only under VEVRA itself, he 
must show that a private right of action exists. 
 
whether an agency can be sued for failure to comply with its own 
affirmative action plan for disabled veterans, and there is 
nothing in the legislative history indicating that Congress 
intended a private right of action. 
 Antol asserts that if there is no cause of action 
against the agency, then § 4214(c) has no enforcement mechanism. 
However, VEVRA specifically provides for the Office of Personnel 
Management's oversight and review of the affirmative action plans 
required under it: 
The Office of Personnel Management 
shall be responsible for the review 
and evaluation of the 
implementation of this section and 
the activities of each agency to 
carry out the purpose and 
provisions of this section. 
38 U.S.C. § 4214(d).  Section 4214(d) also provides for annual 
reports to Congress on the progress made under the plans. 
Pursuant to its duty under § 4214(d), the Office of Personnel 
Management has authored regulations specifically detailing the 
duty of federal agencies to create, implement, and improve 
affirmative action plans for disabled veterans.  See 5 C.F.R. 
§§720.301-720.306. 
 There may be many reasons why Congress chose not to 
provide for private suit against an Agency under VEVRA to enforce 
§ 4214(c).  We will not speculate as to what those reasons are. 
Regardless of whether we would agree with those reasons, Congress 
did not intend a private right of action, and we cannot create 
one under the guise of statutory construction.  Therefore, we 
will affirm the summary judgment on Antol's claim for non-
monetary relief under VEVRA, and we will reverse and remand 
Antol's claim for monetary relief under VEVRA for the district 
court to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. 
V. 
 Although Antol cannot sue the Agency under VEVRA, 
nonetheless, he has a remedy under the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.  The Rehabilitation Act's extensive statutory scheme 
protects disabled individuals, regardless of veteran status, from 
discrimination by their Agency employers and requires 
implementation of an affirmative action plan. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 
794.  Under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, Antol argues that 
the Agency failed to follow its affirmative action plan, in 
violation of the Act, and that the violation constitutes a breach 
of its duty to reasonably accommodate individuals with 
disabilities.  Antol also argues generally that in failing to 
promote him, the Agency discriminated against him based on his 
disability. 
 In the context of employment 
discrimination, the ADA, ADEA and Title VII 
all serve the same purpose--to prohibit 
discrimination in employment against members 
of certain classes.  Therefore, it follows 
that the methods and manner of proof under 
one statute should inform the standards under 
the others as well. . . . In addition, courts 
routinely employ the Title VII burden-
shifting rules in pretext cases brought under 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 
§701 et seq., which prohibits disability 
discrimination in public employment. 
Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1995). 
"Whether suit is filed under the Rehabilitation Act or under the 
Disabilities Act, the substantive standards for determining 
liability are the same."  McDonald v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't. 
of Public Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995).   
A. 
 Antol miscasts his case as one involving accommodation, 
citing the following discussion in Prewitt v. United States 
Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981): 
Preliminarily, however, we should observe 
that section 501 requires affirmative action 
on the part of federal agencies; unlike 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act which 
usually require only nondiscrimination. . . . 
[S]ection 501 requires that federal agencies 
do more than just submit affirmative action 
plans--section 501 "impose[s] a duty upon 
federal agencies to structure their 
procedures and programs so as to ensure that 
handicapped individuals are afforded equal 
opportunity in both job assignment and 
promotion." 
Id. at 306 (quoting Ryan v. FDIC, 565 F.2d 762, 763 (D.C. Cir. 
1977)). 
 That Antol's allegations center around an affirmative 
action plan does not render it a reasonable accommodation case. 
Reasonable accommodation refers to affirmative efforts which the 
employer must take in order to ensure that an employee can 
perform the essential job functions.  See McDonald, 62 F.3d at 
92.  Employers can not legitimate their failure to promote or 
hire a disabled individual if they can remedy an individual's 
inability to perform the required job function through reasonable 
accommodation, such as by providing special equipment or making a 
simple change in job structure.  Where an employer can 
accommodate a disabled individual without undue burden, the 
refusal to make necessary accommodations can become unreasonable 
and discriminatory.  See Americans Disabled for Accessible Pub. 
Transp. v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1192 (3d Cir. 1989) (in banc). 
 In Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 
1993), on which Antol relies, the plaintiff sought a transfer to 
an available position in another city to allow him to pursue AIDS 
therapy.  The court held that this accommodation, especially 
where the condition was life-threatening, was reasonable and 
necessary in order to enable the plaintiff to continue performing 
his job.  The court emphasized that the plaintiff did not seek 
another job or a promotion.  Antol, however, did seek a different 
position and did not need accommodation to qualify him or enable 
him to perform it. 
 The Agency did not defend by arguing that Antol was 
unqualified.  Rather, it argued that the selecting officer 
considered him less qualified for the trainee position than the 
two successful candidates.  Accommodation regards efforts that 
address the individual's ability to perform a job, not his 
entitlement to it.  For that reason, the district court 
appropriately did not analyze his case as one involving the duty 
of reasonable accommodation. 
B. 
 Antol also argues that the Agency intentionally 
discriminated against him.   In response to Antol's prima facie 
case, the Agency articulated as its legitimate non-discriminatory 
reason for not selecting Antol that the selecting official 
preferred an applicant with a college degree and felt that the 
work experience of the two successful candidates made them better 
qualified for the job.  The burden then shifted to Antol to 
produce sufficient evidence of pretext, rebutting the Agency's 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason.  The district court 
characterized Antol's evidence as consisting merely of a stray 
remark and a single violation of the affirmative action plan.  It 
held that a single violation of an affirmative action plan does 
not constitute a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, and further 
opined that although the violation of the affirmative action plan 
is evidence of discrimination, Antol produced insufficient 
evidence of pretext to rebut the Agency's proffered legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason.  It therefore granted the Agency's 
motion for summary judgment.  We will reverse. 
 We note at the outset that we need not and do not 
consider whether a single violation of an Agency's affirmative 
action plan mandated by the Rehabilitation Act constitutes a 
violation of the Act.  As we stated, supra, VEVRA does not 
provide an action against the Agency for failure to comply with 
38 U.S.C. § 4214(c)'s mandatory affirmative action plan.  Thus, 
Antol cannot transform an alleged VEVRA violation into a per se 
Rehabilitation Act violation.0 
                     
0Antol did not produce evidence that the Agency violated its 
Rehabilitation Act affirmative action plan.  At issue is the 
affirmative action plan for disabled veterans required by VEVRA, 
not the plan required by the Rehabilitation Act.  The dissent, 
however, would find that VEVRA expressly provides a private right 
of action and incorporates the Rehabilitation Act's remedies by 
requiring agencies to include their VEVRA affirmative action plan 
for disabled veterans in their Rehabilitation Act affirmative 
action plan for disabled individuals. 
 Contrary to the characterization adopted by the Agency 
and the district court, Antol's evidence did not consist merely 
of a single violation of an affirmative action plan and a stray 
remark by a non-decisionmaker.  Rather, Antol produced the 
following evidence of pretext:  1) that the Agency violated its 
affirmative action plan for disabled veterans by failing to 
provide Antol a truly non-competitive interview; 2) that, in 
general, selecting officials repeatedly resisted full 
implementation of the affirmative action plan; 3) that the 
selecting official's supervisor, who was involved in the 
selection process, uttered grossly distasteful epithets against 
Antol regarding his disability, referring to him as "spasm head;" 
4) that the position did not require a college degree and was a 
trainee position; and 5) that the selecting official changed his 
justification for not selecting Antol after the personnel 
staffing specialist pointed out that his justification for not 
selecting Antol would not suffice.  Accordingly, we find that the 
record reflects a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether the Agency's asserted reason for not selecting Antol is a 
pretext for discrimination.   
 In Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), we 
stated that, for a plaintiff to prevail: 
when the defendant answers the plaintiff's 
prima facie case with legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reasons for its action, 
the plaintiff must point to some evidence, 
direct or circumstantial, from which a 
factfinder could reasonably either (1) 
disbelieve the employer's articulated 
legitimate reasons;  or (2) believe that an 
invidious discriminatory reason was more 
likely than not a motivating or determinative 
cause of the employer's action. 
32 F.3d at 764.  We do not require the plaintiff to adduce 
evidence directly contradicting the defendant's proffered  
legitimate reasons. Id. 
 In support of Antol's motion for summary judgment and 
in opposition to the Agency's motion, Antol submitted testimony 
by Mr. Hubbard, a personnel staffing specialist for the Agency 
who has special responsibility for the affirmative action plan, 
that in Antol's case, the Agency violated its affirmative action 
plan0 by providing the list of other candidates to the selecting 
official before Antol's non-competitive interview.  In addition 
to providing the merit list prematurely, Personnel failed to 
provide the selecting official with the required command policy 
statement in support of affirmative action.  Hubbard also 
testified that Agency personnel actively resisted efforts to 
implement the affirmative action plan, and that the plan rarely, 
if ever, resulted in non-competitive hiring of a disabled 
veteran.   The Agency's failure to adhere to its own rules is 
evidence of discriminatory intent. See Colgan v. Fisher 
Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1422-23 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991).   
                     
0We recognize that the affirmative action plan at issue provides 
a preference for disabled individuals who are veterans. Standing 
alone, evidence that the Agency violated this plan in Antol's 
case might not be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment.  Nevertheless, when combined with the other evidence 
which casts doubt on the credence of the asserted reason for the 
defendant's employment decision, an inference of discriminatory 
motive is permissible. 
 In the context of Title VII, the Ninth Circuit has 
stated that "evidence that the employer violated its own 
affirmative action plan may be relevant to the question of 
discriminatory intent." Gonzales v. Police Dep't., San Jose, 
Cal., 901 F.2d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Yatvin v. 
Madison Metro. School Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 415-416 (7th Cir. 
1988) (violation of a voluntary affirmative action plan might 
help support a claim of discrimination); Craik v. Minnesota State 
University Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 472 (8th Cir. 1984) ("evidence that 
employer has failed to live up to [a voluntary] affirmative 
action plan is relevant to the question of discriminatory 
intent.").  But see Liao v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 867 F.2d 
1366, 1369 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078 (1990) 
(failure to give preference under voluntary affirmative action 
plan cannot support allegation of discrimination).  The 
circumstances of the failure to follow the affirmative action 
plan bear on its relevance.  Here, the crux of the Agency's 
affirmative action plan is an applicant's enhanced opportunity 
for selection through non-competitive consideration.  Although 
the Agency granted Antol an initial and separate interview, the 
selecting official's knowledge of the merit candidates 
eviscerated the plan's core benefit:  non-competitive 
consideration.  The Agency's failure to follow its own plan in 
Antol's case and the more general active resistance by selecting 
officials to its implementation is relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 
401 as to whether Smith, the selecting official who rejected 
Antol, fairly considered Antol's candidacy.  A reasonable jury 
could consider the Agency's failure to take seriously its stated 
commitment to disabled veterans and the active resistance to 
implementing that commitment as evidence of discriminatory 
intent. 
 In order to defeat the motion for summary judgment, 
Antol also offered evidence of discriminatory animus:  Smith's 
supervisor, Mr. Gomez, referred to Antol as "spasm head." Antol's 
affidavit averred that Antol had become accustomed to the 
epithet.  Characterizing it as a "stray remark," the district 
court afforded it little weight.  The district court did not 
appropriately consider this demeaning remark as probative 
evidence; because the Agency sent correspondence relating to the 
selection process and submitted Antol's application through Gomez 
to Smith, and Gomez discussed Antol's application with Smith, it 
was much more than a mere stray remark. 
 Gomez' involvement in and influence on the 
decisionmaking process was as Smith's supervisor.  This is not a 
case where the person making the statement "was outside the chain 
of decision-makers who had the authority to hire and fire 
plaintiff."  Gomez v. Allegheny Health Services, Inc., 71 F.3d 
1079, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr 
and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 546-47 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993) (six comments made over the five 
years before decision at issue by individual not working for 
employer at time of decision too remote to show independently 
that unlawful discrimination more likely than proffered reason). 
Evidence that an individual involved in the selection process, 
such as the decisionmaker's supervisor, referred to Antol as 
"spasm head" often enough for Antol to state that he had become 
accustomed to it, supports an inference of discrimination.  See 
Wilson v. Susquehanna Township Police Department, 55 F.3d 126, 
128-30 (3d Cir. 1995) (statement by decisionmaker's supervisor 
that "there would be no woman supervisor if he had anything to do 
with it" was not a stray remark); see also Lockhart v. 
Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 54 (3d Cir. 1989) ("When 
a major company executive speaks, 'everybody listens' in the 
corporate hierarchy."), overruled on other grounds as recognized 
by Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1099 
n.10.  In a recent case, we credited "evidence of age-related 
animus or bias in the form of a comment made to" the plaintiff by 
a person involved in the decision to terminate him.  Waldron v. 
SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 502 (3d Cir. 1995).  We held that: 
[T]he comment may be entitled to some weight 
when considered by the jury, although 
standing on its own it would likely be 
insufficient to demonstrate age-related 
animus.  In other words, the comment is not 
irrelevant, especially when coupled with 
[plaintiff's] other evidence of 
discrimination. 
Id.  Moreover, the slur used by Gomez, as compared to the 
"suggestion" in Waldron that the plaintiff lose weight to look 
younger, clearly demonstrates disability-related animus. 
 Regardless of whether Gomez ever repeated the slur to 
Smith, it is evidence of the atmosphere and context in which 
Smith made the employment decision.  The factfinder may likewise 
consider the evidence regarding resistance to affirmative action 
as evidence of the atmosphere in which the Agency made its 
employment decisions.  See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining 
Corporation, 72 F.3d 326, 333 (3d Cir. 1995) (evidence of 
employer's "culture" is circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination); Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545 (citing Roebuck v. Drexel 
University, 852 F.2d 715, 733 (3d Cir. 1988) (although temporally 
remote statements standing alone would not suffice, they support 
finding of discrimination when combined with other evidence)). 
Circumstantial proof of discrimination 
typically includes unflattering testimony 
about the employer's history and work 
practices--evidence which in other kinds of 
cases may well unfairly prejudice the jury 
against the defendant.  In discrimination 
cases, however, such background evidence may 
be critical for the jury's assessment of 
whether a given employer was more likely than 
not to have acted from an unlawful motive. 
Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir. 
1988).  The atmosphere is relevant to whether defendant's 
asserted legitimate non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual, 
and relevant to the ultimate issue of whether defendant 
intentionally discriminated against plaintiff. 
 A factfinder can use evidence revealing inconsistencies 
in statements or procedures and evidence revealing a hostile 
atmosphere to find pretext. See Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 
34 F.3d 188, 194-195 (3d Cir. 1994); Josey v. John R. 
Hollingsworth Corp. 996 F.2d 632, 639-641 (3d Cir. 1993).  
[W]e recognize that proof of a discriminatory 
atmosphere may be relevant in proving pretext 
since such evidence does tend to add color to 
the employer's decisionmaking processes and 
to the influences behind the actions taken 
with respect to the individual plaintiff. 
Ezold, 983 at 546 (internal quotations omitted). 
 The Agency now asserts that Smith rejected Antol 
because he preferred a college graduate.  There is evidence, 
however, that the selecting officer changed his original 
justification for rejecting Antol after Hubbard alerted him to 
problems with his justification.  It is unclear from the record 
just what that original justification was. 
 The Agency required Smith to provide a justification 
letter explaining his failure to select Antol.  Ms. Gallo, a 
personnel support specialist, sent him a sample justification 
letter.  After Smith had completed the interview process, Hubbard 
spoke with Smith regarding his concerns with Smith's original 
justification for passing over Antol, in light of the fact that 
the position was for a trainee.  Hubbard testified that he talked 
with Smith, 
and let him know that justification wouldn't 
fly and told him that he has to be most 
persuasive in describing why he is selecting 
the individuals based on their education, 
experience, and knowledge of the job, and he 
reviewed the letter, but I did not tell him 
what to say. 
Hubbard told Smith to write a second justification letter.  From 
this evidence a factfinder could disbelieve the reasons which the 
Agency now articulates for not selecting Antol.  A factfinder 
might reasonably infer that the justification now asserted is a 
pretext for the true reason Smith did not select Antol.  Where 
the Agency's own personnel specialist found fault with the 
justification, and this prompts changes in the justification, a 
factfinder could view the final justification as less worthy of 
credence. 
 The job announcement for the position indicated that 
qualified applicants must either have a college degree or three 
years of experience in specified fields, excluding certain 
clerical and technical support experience.  Antol qualified for 
the position based on his experience; one of the successful 
candidates, Ms. Davis, did not.  Yet the selecting official 
considered Antol's experience substantially inferior to that of 
Ms. Davis.  A factfinder could question, as inconsistent, Smith's 
subjective evaluation when the Agency deemed Antol's experience 
equivalent to a college degree for qualification purposes, and 
deemed Ms. Davis' experience alone insufficient to qualify her 
for the position. 
 Antol produced sufficient evidence of pretext from 
which a factfinder could reasonably infer discrimination.  In 
combination, the failure to follow Agency procedures, the 
decisionmakers' active resistance to the affirmative action plan, 
the references to Antol as "spasm head" by the decisionmaker's 
supervisor, and the labile nature of the justification for the 
employment decision, permit a finding of pretext.  Therefore, the 
Agency failed to show that it was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on Antol's disability discrimination claim, and we 
will reverse the district court on this issue.   Although this 
evidence permits an inference of discrimination, that result is 
by no means mandated.  Therefore, we will affirm the denial of 
Antol's cross-motion for summary judgment. 
VI. 
 In sum, we affirm the summary judgment for the Agency 
on the gender discrimination claim and on the claim for non-
monetary relief under 38 U.S.C. § 4214(c).  Because VEVRA does 
not contain a waiver of sovereign immunity from Antol's suit for 
money damages under § 4214(c), we will reverse the order entering 
judgment on this claim and remand with instructions for the 
district court to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.  Although 
we affirm the denial of summary judgment in favor of Antol, we 
find that the district court erred by granting summary judgment 
to the Agency on Antol's disability discrimination claim, and we 
therefore reverse and remand the cause for the district court to 
consider the remaining disability discrimination claim. 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
 I join the opinion of the court, but I wish to clarify 
my understanding of the significance of the Agency's violation of 
its Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act (VEVRA), 38 
U.S.C. § 4214, affirmative action plan.  We reverse the decision 
of the district court and remand for further proceedings with 
respect to Antol's claim that the Agency intentionally 
discriminated against him because of his disability.  In order to 
succeed on this claim, Antol must prove that (putting aside the 
question of reasonable accommodation) the Agency gave him less 
favorable treatment than it would have given an identical 
applicant without a disability.  Southeastern Community College 
v. Dans, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).0  The VEVRA affirmative action plan 
required the Agency to give Antol more favorable treatment than 
either (a) an identical applicant without a disability or (b) an 
identical applicant with a disability who did not fall within 
VEVRA's coverage.  While I agree that evidence of the Agency's 
violation of the VEVRA affirmative action plan meets the low 
standard of relevance set out in Fed. R. Evid. 401, this evidence 
seems to me to have very little probative value for the purpose 
of proving intentional discrimination against Antol.  However, 
even without this evidence, I think that the proof in the record 
is sufficient to defeat summary judgment for the Agency under the 
standard contained in Fuentes v. Peskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 
1994)0, or the somewhat different standards adopted by other 
circuits.  See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989 
(5th Cir. 1996) (in banc). 
 
SAROKIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 I join the Court's opinion as to Parts I, II, III, 
IV.A.  However, because I believe that VEVRA does create a 
private cause of action, I dissent from Part IV.B. 
 I do not agree that Congress would require federal 
agencies to implement affirmative action plans designed to 
                     
0Although Antol's claim is couched as a claim under Section 501 
of the Rehabilitation Act, § 791, it is the equivalent of a §504 
claim.  See Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196, 198-201 (3d Cir. 1995). 
0Our court has granted rehearing in banc in a case that presents 
the question whether the Fuentes standard is correct. See 
Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., No. 94-7509. 
protect employees from discrimination, but then give employees no 
adequate recourse if an agency violated its plan and denied 
employees those very procedures designed to protect them.  My 
position is based upon my understanding of the statutory scheme 
designed by Congress -- an understanding similar to that of the 
one reported federal case that is precisely on point, Blizzard v. 
Dalton, 876 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Va. 1995).  The court's statutory 
analysis in that case convinces me as a matter of law that 
Congress did not enact a legislative toothless tiger. 
 The deciding issue is the relationship between section 
403 and section 501(b). Section 403(a)(c) states: 
Each agency [of the federal government] shall 
include in its affirmative action plan for 
the hiring, placement, and advancement of 
handicapped individuals in such agency as 
required by section 501(b) of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 
791(b)), a separate specification of plans . 
. . to promote and carry out such affirmative 
action with respect to disabled veterans in 
order to achieve the purpose of this section. 
 
38 U.S.C. § 4214(c) (emphasis added).   
 The plain language of § 403(a) does more than "merely 
mentioning the Rehabilitation Act."  Majority Opinion, typescript 
at 10.  It makes the plan with respect to disabled veterans a 
part of the agency's 501(b) plan.  See Blizzard, 876 F. Supp. at 
98 ("[A]ffirmative action protection for disabled veterans . . . 
comprises part of the Department of [Defense]'s affirmative 
action plan under section 501(b) of the Rehabilitation Act.").   
 Accordingly, there is no need to "enlarge the waiver in 
the Rehabilitation Act 'beyond what the language of the statute 
requires,'" Majority Opinion, typescript at 10; and there was no 
need for Congress to provide a private cause of action as part of 
VEVRA since a person aggrieved under VEVRA is at the same time 
aggrieved under section 501(b), and since "section 505(a)(1) of 
the Rehabilitation Act provides that individuals aggrieved under 
section 501(b) of the Act, can seek redress through a private 
right of action."  Blizzard, 876 F. Supp. at 98.  There was also 
no need for Congress to "include in VEVRA a section adopting the 
rights or remedies of the Rehabilitation Act," Majority Opinion, 
typescript at 12, since section 505(a)(1) plainly applies to a 
501 plan, of which the 403 plan is merely a subpart.  There is no 
need to "heap inference upon inference," Majority Opinion, 
typescript at 12, because the statutory scheme is 
straightforward. 
 Therefore, as I think the court correctly concluded in 
Blizzard, I would hold that "Plaintiff's allegation that he 
suffered discrimination under the disabled veterans portion of 
the 'Section 501(b) Plan' allows him access to the rights and 
remedies contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-16."  Id.  For this reason, I dissent. 
